Abstract Ultra lightweight Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) authentication protocols are suitable for lo w*cost RFID tags with restricted computational power and memory space. Recently, Lee proposed two ultra lightweight authentication protocols for low*cost RFID tags, namely DIDRFID an d SIDRFID protocols. The first protocol is based on dynamic identity and the second one on static identity. Lee claimed that his protocols can resist tracking, replay, impersonation and DOS attacks. In this paper, we show that Lee’s protocol s are not secure and they are vulnerable against tr acking, impersonation, and full disclosure attacks. Specially, an adversar y can accomplish an effective full disclosure attack on DIDRFID protocol by eavesdropping two consecutive sessions and gets all the secret information stored on a tag. Also, we demonstrate that an adversary with ability of obtaining secret informat ion of a single compromised tag in SIDRFID protocol , can get the secret information of other tags and she/he can completely control the whole RFID system.

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[15] Yeh T. and Wua C., Improvement of the RFID Authentication Scheme based on Quadratic Residues, Computer Communications , vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 3376341, 2011. Yousof Farzaneh received his MS degree in mathematics from Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST), Iran, in 2004. Currently, he is a PhD student in the School of Mathematics at Iran University of Science and Technology. His research interests include cryptography and network security. Mahdi Azizi received his MS and PhD degrees in communications, cryptology and information security from the IHU, Iran, in 2006 and 2012 respectively. His research interests include RFID security, authentication protocols and cryptanalysis. Masoud Dehkordi received his PhD degree in mathematics from Loughborough University, UK, in 1998. He is currently a professor of mathematics at the school of Mathematical Sciences in Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST), Iran. His research interests include number theory, cryptography and other relat ed topics. Abdolrasoul Mirghadri received his PhD degree in mathematical Statistics, from the faculty of Science, Shiraz University in 2001. He is an associate professor at the faculty and research center of communication and information technology, IHU, Iran since 1989. His research interest includes: Cryptography, statistics and stochastic processes. He is a member of ISC, ISS an d IMS.